

FACTS ABOUT - - -

THE
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

November 1971

Mr. Coffey -

This is the copy of
the "fact book" approved
by the Director. His
comment is most gracious.

And, I suggest you may
want to mention in
the next weekly staff
meeting.

PSD is printing and
we should have a finished
copy by mid-week, i.e.,
15 Dec.




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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Here is the "Fact Book" which you asked be prepared and which we discussed briefly yesterday. A lot of people have worked on it including Hugh Cunningham, Cord Meyer, Bill Colby, the MAG group and many others. I think it is well done and is ready to go in classified format, with the understanding that it probably should be updated in another 6 to 12 months. *G-12*

I thought you should scan it before we release it. It takes about 20 to 30 minutes reading time.

LKW



L. K. White

*This is a fine
job, just what I
wanted, let's go to press.*

4 December 1971
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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FOREWORD

The attached is for the information of all CIA employees, especially CIA personnel recruiters, domestic contact officers, CIA students at the senior service schools, and other officials who are in regular contact with the public. It serves as a supplement to three unclassified Agency publications: the 1971 "Blue Book," the Director's address of 4 April 1971 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on "Global Intelligence and the Democratic Society," and the brochure on personnel recruitment. Its purpose is to help answer the kinds of questions about CIA and its activities which frequently appear in the public media and are discussed by the public.

The booklet in this printed form is classified "Confidential" simply because the Agency has not publicly taken an official position on most of the events discussed and cannot do so at this time in this form. Nevertheless, employees are encouraged to use this factual background information in interviews with applicants and in discussions with interested outsiders. The booklet, however, should not be shown to non-Agency personnel.

This compilation is neither definitive nor all inclusive--in the sense that there is a single way of answering questions about CIA. Officers should enlarge their knowledge of the points covered, as well as other aspects of intelligence, by additional reading and by requesting specific guidance from Headquarters on new questions as they arise. Tact, common sense, and candor are as important as any "authoritative" answer. The booklet is no more than a guide, but it does embody the Agency's determination to take the public's questions seriously and to answer them as straightforwardly as possible.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence and the National Interest

Intelligence has been for centuries an activity practiced by nations in their conduct of foreign affairs. While by no means the principal instrument, the intelligence function supplements and enhances the more visible means--diplomacy, military and economic power, national and personal charisma, and others--which a nation employs in its international relations.

The major task of a foreign intelligence arm is to gather information about foreign situations--the well known and readily available as well as the hidden--and to synthesize it into a meaningful mosaic for the policy-maker anxious to protect his country's interests.

Frequently, the mosaic can be constructed simply by a systematic piecing together of publicly known data and views. In many instances, however, information obtained clandestinely makes a critical contribution.

Perhaps the best single illustration of the importance of secret intelligence is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Without the U-2 and information supplied by Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, a senior officer in Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) and a CIA agent, the United States might have been led into catastrophic error. The public record of Soviet aggression which had been accumulating since 1948, the then more recent spectacular advances in their technology (nuclear arms, missiles, Sputnik), and their constantly truculent statements ("We will bury you!") had already caused a genuine national alarm.

Without other accurate information to go on, our discovery of the placement of offensive missiles in Cuba could quickly have brought on World War III: The U. S. Government would have overestimated their capabilities and would have had to react in ignorant desperation. (This would have been all the more probable if we had not learned of the missiles until they were all in place.) As it was, our knowledge of Soviet vulnerabilities made it possible for President Kennedy to act in a resolute but carefully measured way which caused the Soviets to back down and the danger of global war to recede.

That event sums up an overriding concern of U. S. intelligence--to prevent World War III. The present American intelligence system was created by men who had seen World War I lead to World War II in just over twenty years. In the early years of the Cold War, no one could be confident that World War III would not arise suddenly out of the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, the Hungarian and Suez crises of 1956, or other alarming developments. Now, a whole generation after World War II, the imminence of a new and final confrontation seems comfortably unreal to most Americans, especially to those too young to remember those genuine threats to our national survival.

No one can prove that it was U. S. intelligence which has prevented World War III so far, of course, but few serious students of world affairs can doubt that our growing knowledge of the other superpower (especially during the 1960's) has materially lessened both the threat to our survival and the danger of reactions from ignorance on our side. U. S. intelligence has made many mistakes since 1945, but on this crucial point the record is reassuring.

One important evidence of how much the situation has changed is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Such negotiations could never have been contemplated had it not been for the consistent progress of U. S. intelligence to monitor the actions of the other side and keep it honest. Now it is possible to hope that SALT will bring about a gradual but substantial lessening of international tensions. Even so, eternal vigilance is still the price we must pay for our liberties, and it is U. S. intelligence which exercises that vigilance against all dangers from abroad.

But the contributions of intelligence are not limited to life-and-death military confrontations. The more the world comes to resemble McLuhan's "global village" the more necessary it is for Americans to understand their global neighbors, good and bad, developing or decaying, threatened or threatening, in all the ways in which their interests interact or conflict with ours. Intelligence is one important means by which we increase that understanding and enable our policy-makers to base their judgments upon accurate information. Our effort to understand the world outside our shores involves not only the collection of vast quantities of data of all sorts, but endless patient sifting and analysis of those data. Our functions have already broadened far beyond the comparatively simple requirements of the Cold War, and one of our principal contributions during the 1970's must be careful study of how, and how much, the world is changing around us.

Intelligence and Policy

U. S. intelligence doctrine, predicated on statutes and our national heritage, requires a separation of intelligence and policy. Intelligence officers report international developments and interpret their meaning, but they do not recommend courses of action to be undertaken by the U. S. Formulation of foreign policy must take into account many factors of which foreign intelligence is but one, although an important one.

In international affairs, it is the President who makes policy, subject only to the relevant constitutional restraints placed upon the powers of his office. It is customary for him to seek policy recommendations from individual advisers, such as the Secretary of State, or from the National Security Council. In turn, their recommendations are based in considerable measure on analyses of foreign developments--in other words, on intelligence. Thus, while U. S. intelligence agencies neither make nor recommend policy decisions, they do influence them through the very nature of the findings they produce. That is why intelligence organizations exist.

Intelligence as an Instrument of Policy

There are occasions when an intelligence organization is directed by policy-makers to undertake specified actions in the wake of certain policy decisions or in pursuit of existing policy objectives.

An example of this which has focused strong attention upon the Central Intelligence Agency has been the program to train Meo tribesmen as guerrilla

fighters in Laos. U. S. policy-makers believed that it was in our interest to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia; in the early 1960's they decided that U. S. action, short of full-scale involvement of American military forces, had to be taken, particularly in Laos.

As a result, the Agency was directed to support a local guerrilla capability to prevent a takeover of that country by forces of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam. Overt, official U. S. involvement would have multiplied the risk of an open confrontation with North Vietnam--and possibly Communist China--in which regular military forces on both sides might be called in to fight a markedly expanded war.

This basic policy and its method of implementation have been reaffirmed by successive Administrations since that time.

Intelligence and a Democratic Society

Much has been printed to the effect that secrecy of any kind, and therefore intelligence operations of any kind, must be incompatible with the existence of a free society. This is a frequent contention of some elements of the public media, which naturally have a strong interest in access to all information; but the American electorate has not appeared to support this contention.

Apart from our statesmen, an early authentic folk-hero was, in fact, an intelligence agent: Nathan Hale. Few Americans could name a half-dozen signers of the Declaration of Independence, but every schoolboy knows of Paul Revere and what made him famous: his success in carrying out the important

intelligence function we now call Early Warning. Many of our statesmen showed an interest in espionage even before it became a recognized instrument of our Government; men like George Washington, an expert manager of espionage operations in wartime, and Benjamin Franklin, who conducted secret operations during his mission to Paris. Our first best-selling novelist, James Fenimore Cooper, named one of his most popular novels The Spy, and his other novels idealized our native embodiment of the intelligence function --the frontier scout. From that day to the present, with its rash of movie and TV thrillers, many of them absurdly overdrawn, the collection of information by various forms of espionage has had a romantic fascination for our people. (Unfortunately, most spy-fiction bears about the same resemblance to intelligence as science fiction does to science.)

Yet, intelligence did not become crucial to our survival until World War II. If at that time intelligence had seemed repugnant to the American way of life, or merely romantic by-play, the Central Intelligence Agency could never have been created. And if, since that time, the Agency had not developed highly professional skills and had not satisfied its superiors in the executive and legislative branches of the Government as to its integrity and effectiveness, it probably could not have survived.

The Development of Modern American Intelligence

During and after World War II two necessities focused a new and stronger light upon the importance of intelligence. One was a matter of scale:

Instead of frontier scouts and the primitive effort of the Pinkertons during the Civil War, the United States now had to develop a system for collecting information on events and trends throughout the world. As a world power whose security problems had expanded far beyond our frontiers, we could do no less. The other development was the recognition that collecting information was not enough. We had also to assemble the best available minds to sift, analyze, evaluate, and interpret all the information collected.

Congress undertook a systematic review of the entire national security structure, including the Government's intelligence resources. In the background were the lessons of Pearl Harbor, in the foreground the new obligations of international leadership, and over the horizon the first glimmerings of the Cold War.

If the historical context explains the concern and the felt need for a professional intelligence system, a look at what then existed confirmed the necessity of a new organization (1) to undertake those intelligence functions that are outside the normal scope of the military and diplomatic services and (2) to coordinate and systematize the whole intelligence effort.

The result of the Congressional inquiry was the passage, in 1947, of the National Security Act. Among other things, the statute established the Central Intelligence Agency as an independent, civilian Agency under the President and the newly created National Security Council.

Coordination of Intelligence

American intelligence today is the result of the coordinated efforts of CIA and the departmental intelligence units in State and Defense --collectively referred to as the "intelligence community." The community is guided by a division of labor spelled out in National Security Council Intelligence Directives. However, continuing coordination is needed to prevent unnecessary duplication of activity (some duplication is necessary for cross-checking and validation), to eliminate gaps in coverage, and to correlate intelligence judgments. This coordination role devolves upon the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is at once (1) Intelligence Adviser to the President and the Council, (2) coordinator of U. S. foreign intelligence, and (3) head of CIA.

The Director's responsibility for coordination does not carry with it the power to command any intelligence agencies other than CIA. Rather it is a question of leadership, consultation, and recommendation to the Council. To advise and assist the Director in this coordination task, the Council has established the United States Intelligence Board as the formal structure of the intelligence community. The Board, which meets weekly, has as members:

- (1) The Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman, representing the President
- (2) The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, representing CIA
- (3) The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- (4) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense
- (5) The Director, National Security Agency, Department of Defense
- (6) The representative of the Secretary of the Treasury
- (7) The representative of the Atomic Energy Commission
- (8) The representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

There are also three "service observers"--the intelligence chiefs of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force--and a number of interagency subcommittees that coordinate in specialized areas, such as intelligence on economic or scientific matters, foreign guided missiles, and collection by clandestine or technical means.

Although the impact on the intelligence community had not been determined as this booklet was being prepared, the President on 5 November 1971 announced broader responsibilities for the DCI. The official announcement said that the DCI would have "an enhanced leadership role . . . in planning, reviewing, coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence." The full text of the White House statement is contained in Appendix B.

In addition to the Director's existing responsibilities for coordinating the substance of intelligence reports through the USIB mechanism, these new duties will involve the coordination of intelligence resources utilized by the entire intelligence community. Exactly how this will work in actual practice will be determined as the intelligence community and the Director gain experience with these new responsibilities during the coming months.

THE FUNCTIONS OF CIA

Scope of Activity

The full scope of CIA activities embraces (1) continuing responsibilities in intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and counterintelligence; and (2) occasional responsibilities in covert action when so directed by the President or the National Security Council.

Concentrating first on collection and analysis, it should be noted that both are equally stressed as complementary aspects of the intelligence process. The collector is in the field, the analyst at Headquarters; the first is factual in emphasis, the second interpretive. In the interplay between the two lies much of the strength of American intelligence.

Collection Functions

CIA gathers intelligence information through overt, technical, and clandestine means.

Information is gleaned from a careful scrutiny of foreign newspapers and periodicals, from the monitoring of foreign news and propaganda broadcasts, and from the interviewing of domestic sources of information on developments in foreign countries. The latter involves running a voluntary interviewing system in the U. S. whereby private citizens with a specialized knowledge of foreign lands who wish to share their expertise with the Government are able to do so.